Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g., in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Guruswami et al. [9] propose this problem and give logarithmic approximations (in the number of consumers) for the unit-demand and single-parameter cases where there is a specific set of consumers and their valuations for bundles are known precisely. Subsequently several versions of the problem have been shown to have poly-logarithmic inapproximability. This problem has direct ties to the important open question of better understanding the Bayesian optimal mechanism in multi-parameter agent settings; however, for this purpose approximation factors logarithmic in the number of agents are inadequate. It is therefore of vital interest to consider special cases where constant approximations are possible.
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We consider the unit-demand variant of this pricing problem. Here a consumer has a valuation for each different item and their value for a set of items is simply the maximum value they have for any item in the set. Instead of considering a set of consumers with precisely known preferences, like the prior algorithmic pricing literature, we assume that the preferences of the consumers are drawn from a distribution. This is the standard assumption in economics; furthermore, the setting of a specific set of customers with specific preferences, which is employed in all of the prior work in algorithmic pricing, is a special case of this general Bayesian pricing problem, where there is a discrete Bayesian distribution for preferences specified by picking one consumer uniformly from the given set of consumers. Notice that the distribution over the valuations for the individual items that this generates is obviously correlated. Our work complements these existing works by considering the case where the consumer's valuations for the different items are independent random variables. Our main * Research supported by an NSF Mathematical Sciences Postdoctoral Research Fellowship. Portions of this work were completed while the author was an NSF postdoctoral fellow at U.C. Berkeley.
INTRODUCTION
It is vital to the study of resource allocation in distributed settings such as the Internet that inherent economic issues be addressed. Recently the area of algorithmic pricing [1, 4, 5, 9, 10] has emerged as a setting for studying optimization in resource allocation in the presence of a natural fairness constraint: there is a uniform pricing rule under which the consumers are allowed to choose the allocation they most desire. This area has important connections to algorithmic mechanism design [2, 3, 9] in addition to obvious applications in traditional market settings such as pricing items in a supermarket.
A pricing can be thought of as a menu listing the prices for all possible allocations to a consumer. Given a pricing, a consumer's preference indicates a most desired allocation. The algorithmic pricing problem, then, is to take an instance given by a class of allowable pricings and a set of consumers, and compute the pricing maximizing (or approximately maximizing) a specific objective. An item-pricing is one where each individual item is assigned a price, and the price of any bundle is the sum of the prices of the items in the bundle. In this arena, the objective of maximizing the profit of the seller presents significant challenges, even when there are no supply constraints. Indeed when the items are pure complements, i.e., consumers are single-minded and combinatorial; and when the items are pure substitutes, i.e., consumers have unit demands, recent works show hardness results for itempricing that essentially match the poor performance of trivial alorithms [7, 5] . This motivates the search for relevant special cases where algorithmic theory gives an improved understanding of pricing.
Algorithmic pricing and algorithmic mechanism design have important connections. Indeed, for unlimited supply profit maximization, Balcan et al. [3] give a general reduction from truthful mechanism design to algorithmic pricing. These results are important, in particular, as they address the challenging problem of optimal mechanism design in multi-parameter settings (e.g., general combinatorial auctions and multi-item unit-demand auctions). On the other hand, in single parameter Bayesian settings (e.g., a single-item auction) the optimal auction is well-understood-the well known result of Myerson [12] gives a closed form characterization for the optimal auction. In this paper we bring these results full-circle by showing that techniques from Myerson's optimal auction are useful for the unit-demand pricing problem. In fact, by designing a pricing to mimic the reserve prices of an optimal auction, we are able to approximate the profit of the optimal auction (and thus, also, the profit of the optimal pricing). Of course, a key difference between single-item auctions and unit-demand pricing is that in an auction the different bids compete against each other, while in a pricing problem there is no competition. Accordingly, our pricing algorithm "simulates competition" by setting higher reserve values.
Formally, the algorithmic mechanism design and algorithmic pricing problems are defined as follows:
• In the special case where F is the product distribution F1 × · · · × Fn, the Bayesian single-item auction problem was solved by Myerson in his seminal paper on mechanism design [12] . His solution is based on determining the allocation of the item for sale using the consumers' virtual valuations (see Section 2), instead of their actual valuations. We consider product distributions for the Bayesian unit-demand pricing problem and show that:
• The optimal revenue of a single-item auction is an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal unit-demand pricing.
• The optimal unit-demand pricing that uses a single virtual price 1 for all items obtains a constant fraction of the revenue of the optimal auction.
• If all the distributions satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition (defined in Section 2), a nearly-optimal virtual price can be computed in polynomial time.
We first demonstrate the connection between BSAP and BUPP in the context of identically distributed valuations, 1 The virtual price is a price in virtual valuation space instead of valuation space.
i.e. when Fi = Fj for all i = j. In this i.i.d. case, our algorithm outputs the same price (not just the same virtual price) for all the items. Note that it is easy to optimize revenue over the space of all pricings that price each item at the same value-just consider the distribution of the maximum valuation (maxi vi) and solve this problem as a singleconsumer single-item revenue maximization problem. One might expect that in the i.i.d. case this optimal single price is in fact the overall optimal pricing. However, a simple example shows that this is not true-consider two items, each with a value independently equal to 1 with probability 2/3 and 2 with probability 1/3; then a simple calculation shows that the pricings (1, 2) and (2, 1) are optimal with respect to revenue 2 and the pricings (1, 1) and (2, 2) are strictly sub-optimal. In Section 3.1 we prove that in the i.i.d. case, the revenue of the optimal single-price solution is a 3.47-approximation to the optimal revenue of the single-item auction.
We extend this result to the case of general product distributions in Section 3.2, proving that the revenue of the optimal single virtual-price solution is a 4-approximation to the optimal revenue of the corresponding BSAP.
In Section 4 we consider distributions that do not satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition (see Definition 3 in Section 2), also called the non-regular case in the economics literature. Myerson's solution to BSAP in this case uses a smoothed or "ironed" version of virtual valuations. We show that the same fix can be applied to the pricing problem and again the revenue of the optimal single ironed-virtual-price solution is a 4-approximation to the optimal revenue of the single-item auction.
We consider the question of computing the optimal virtual price in Section 5. For general discrete distributions that satisfy the MHR condition, we obtain a polynomial time constant-factor approximation algorithm. For general continuous distributions, we consider a computational model in which we have oracle access to the cumulative distribution function and probability density functions the distributions (see Section 2 for more detail), and again obtain a polynomial time approximation algorithm. We leave open the problem of designing a polynomial time approximation algorithm for the non-regular case. The challenge in this case is to come up with a polynomial time algorithm for computing ironedvirtual-valuations.
NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES

The Bayesian Unit-demand Pricing Problem (BUPP)
The input to BUPP is a distribution over n-tuples of valuations. We use v = (v1, · · · , vn) to denote the valuation vector. The value vi is drawn independently from the distribution Fi over the range [ i, hi] . Following standard notation, we use v−i to denote all the valuations except the ith one. F = F1 × · · · × Fn denotes the product distribution from which v is drawn, and fi(vi) denotes the probability density of valuation vi. Our goal is to determine a price vector p = (p1, · · · , pn) such that the expected revenue R p , as defined below, is maximized.
The Monotone Hazard Rate condition
In much of the paper we will assume that the distributions Fi satisfy the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition defined below. This is a standard assumption used in economics. In the single-consumer, single-item case, this condition essentially implies that the revenue as a function of price has a unique maximum.
Definition 3 (Monotone Hazard Rate). A distribution F with density f is said to satisfy the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition if
is monotonically nonincreasing for all v.
In Section 4 we extend our results to distributions that do not satisfy the MHR condition. This is also called the nonregular case in the literature.
The computational model
We consider two different computational models for BUPP:
• (Discrete explicit) In this model, each of the distributions Fi are discrete distributions with small support. These distributions are specified explicitly, and our algorithm is required to run in time polynomial in the number of items n, and the size of the largest support.
• (Continuous with oracles) In this model, the distributions Fi are continuous with known supports
The algorithm is provided the following oracles: an oracle to determine Fi(v) given a value v and an index i, an oracle to determine the density fi(v) given a value v and an index i, and an oracle to sample from the product distribution F. The algorithm is required to run in time polynomial in the number of items n and the range (maxi hi)/(mini i).
Myerson's optimal mechanism
The Bayesian Single-item Auction Problem (BSAP) is described as follows: there is a single item for sale and n bidders with values given by the vector v; each bidder's value vi is drawn independently from a distribution Fi; the goal of the mechanism designer is to design a truthful auction so as to maximize the revenue obtained by the seller from the sale of the item. In one of the seminal works of Bayesian mechanism design, Myerson developed a mechanism for this problem that obtains the maximum revenue for the seller over the class of all truthful mechanisms [12] . Myerson's mechanism (denoted M hereafter) first computes a function of the valuation of each bidder, known as the virtual valuation 3 :
3 The virtual valuations computed by Myerson's mechanism are actually functions of the bids reported by the participants, and not their true values. But given that the mechanism is truthful and these bids are equal to the true values, for simplicity we express the virtual valuations as functions of the true values.
The virtual valuation of a bidder essentially denotes the marginal revenue obtained by allocating the item to this bidder. Myerson's mechanism offers the item to the bidder with the highest virtual valuation, at a price equal to the virtualvaluation-inverse of the second highest virtual valuation (i.e. the value at which the bidder's virtual valuation equals the second highest one, or the minimum bid the bidder needs to make to win the item).
In our subsequent discussions it will sometimes be useful to consider the following alternate description of Myerson's mechanism. The mechanism offers each bidder a take-it-orleave-it price. The price offered to bidder i is equal to φ
where νi = max j =i φj(vj ). Only one bidder (the one with the highest virtual valuation) accepts.
We use b R A to denote the expected revenue of a truthful mechanism A for BSAP. b R M denotes the expected revenue of Myerson's mechanism M. In the following theorem and lemma, we assume that the distributions Fi satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition.
We first note that b R M is at least as large as the expected revenue of any price vector R p for the BUPP.
Proof. For a given pricing p, consider the following mechanism A p : given a valuation vector v, we allocate the item to the bidder i with vi ≥ pi that maximizes vi − pi. Prices are determined by the standard "threshold payment" rule: the winning bidder, i, pays the minimum bid value which would still make i the winner. A p is truthful because it gives a monotone allocation procedure: if a winning bidder unilaterally increases her bid, she still wins. Therefore, b R A p ≤ b R M . Now consider any valuation vector v and suppose that A p allocates the item to bidder i. Then the minimum bid at which this bidder is allocated the item is pi + max j =i (vj − pj , 0), which is at least pi. Therefore, the revenue of A p when the valuation vector is v is at least pi. However, the revenue of the pricing p when the valuation vector is v is exactly pi. Therefore, b R
Combining the two inequalities proves the lemma.
Two observations lead us to connect Myerson's setting to BUPP. First, as the number of bidders gets large (especially in the case of identically distributed valuations), the price offered to a bidder in Myerson's mechanism becomes tightly concentrated around a single value (the expectation of the virtual-value-inverse of the maximum over virtual valuations of other bidders). This value is a reasonable candidate for the price of item i in the pricing problem, and is indeed roughly what we use (with some modifications to allow for an easier analysis).
This approach does not immediately work however. The problem is that in Myerson's mechanism, by allowing the price to be an appropriate function of other bidders' values, we ensure that only one bidder accepts the offered price. In the BUPP, with some probability, more than one of the values is above the corresponding offered price, and the consumer gets to pick which item to buy (i.e. there is a lack of competition). In this case, the price earned by our solution may be much worse than the price earned by Myerson's mechanism for the same valuation vector. Our second observation is that this situation happens with a low probability. Furthermore, we are able to use the monotone hazard rate condition to charge the revenue earned by Myerson's mechanism against the revenue earned by our pricing in the case of such an event.
APPROXIMATING PRICING IN THE REGULAR CASE
In this section we demonstrate that the unit-demand optimal pricing that uses a single virtual price for all items obtains a constant fraction of the revenue of the optimal single-item auction. We begin with the i.i.d. case and then extend our results to general product distributions. Throughout this section we assume that all distributions satisfy the MHR condition (Definition 3).
The i.i.d. case
Let F denote the distribution from which each valuation vi is drawn. Let f denote the density function for this distribution and φ denote the virtual valuation function.
We consider the following pricing in this case: for all i, set
Given this pricing, the probability that a sale is made is exactly Pr[∃i :
n . Using Taylor's expansion and q ≤ 1/n we can simplify this expression as follows:
, we get the following.
pqn.
We now analyze the expected revenue of Myerson's mechanism when each value is distributed according to F . We consider three distinct events. Let Ω0 be the event that the value vector v drawn from F has vi < p for each i. Likewise, Ω1 is the event that vi ≥ p for exactly one index i, and Ω>1 is the event that vi ≥ p for at least two indices i. Let ρ0, ρ1 and ρ>1 denote the contribution of these three events respectively to the expected revenue obtained by Myerson's mechanism.
We now bound these three terms individually. ρ1 is the easiest to bound:
Proof. Suppose that the event Ω1 happens and let v denote the valuation vector drawn from F. Note that the second highest virtual value among {φ(vi)} is strictly less than φ(p). Therefore, the revenue generated from this vector is strictly less than p. On the other hand, this vector contributes p to the expected revenue of the pricing p. Integrating over all such valuation vectors belonging to Ω1 we get the result.
Next we analyze ρ0. We use the fact that the event Ω0 happens with low probability.
Proof. We consider two cases. First, when φ(p) = 0, then in the event Ω0, Myerson's mechanism does not allocate the item to any bidder (because all of them have negative virtual valuations). Therefore, ρ0 = 0 and the lemma holds.
Next Finally, we analyze the contribution of the event Ω>1. Note that even though Ω>1 may be a very low probability event, its contribution to the expected revenue may be quite high, because M may charge prices much higher than p in this event. We handle this issue by using the fact that the distribution F satisfies the MHR condition (Definition 3). The MHR condition, in particular, implies the following (we give a brief proof for completeness). 
all such values is termed Ri(v−i).
Fixing the values of all players except i, we know that Myerson essentially offers a take-it-or-leave-it price p to bidder i. If p < p, then regardless of the value vi, the event Ω>1 does not hold; therefore, Ri(v−i) = 0. On the other hand,
Removing the conditioning on v−i, we get that the contribution of bidder i to ρ>1 is Ri < pq. The lemma follows by summing over all bidders and applying Lemma 3.
Lemmas 4, 5 and 7 together give the following.
Theorem 8. When all valuations are distributed identically, the pricing p given above satisfies
b R M ≤ (3+2/e)R p < 3.74R p .
The general case
Based on the simple pricing algorithm developed in the preceding section, it is very tempting to try setting a single price in the general case as well, for example by computing the distribution Fmax of the random variable maxi vi and setting the price p which maximizes p · (1 − Fmax(p) ). However, the following example shows that algorithms which use a single price cannot achieve a constant-factor approximation to the profit of the optimal pricing. Example 1. Suppose the distribution of vi is given by:
The pricing p which sets pi = n/i achieves a profit of Ω(log n) because
where Hn denotes the n-th harmonic number,
. On the other hand, if p is any pricing which sets pi = p for some fixed value of p > 1, then
This example establishes that no pricing which uses a single price can achieve a o(log n)-approximation to the profit of the optimal pricing.
Rather than using a single price, our solution to the general case is defined as follows. Let ν be the smallest non-negative number such that
In other words, ν is defined such that the event that at least one virtual value is greater than ν has probability exactly 1/2. If this virtual value ν turns out to be negative, we redefine it to be zero. We set the price of each item pi to be φ It is possible to analyze the expected revenue of this pricing using an extension of the technique which we applied to the i.i.d. case in Section 3.1. This leads to a proof of the bound b R M ≤ 7.62R p . We omit the details of this approach. Instead, in this section, we use a different technique to prove the stronger bound b R M ≤ 4R p . Let Mν denote the following truthful mechanism. If all virtual valuations are less than ν, then the item is not sold, and no payments are charged to the bidders. Otherwise, the item is sold to the bidder i with the highest virtual valuation, at a price equal to that bidder's inverse-virtual-valuation of the second-highest virtual valuation, i.e. the minimum bid value that makes i the winner. Myerson's original paper on optimal auction design [12] proves that if an unsold item is worth ν to the seller, then Mν is the truthful auction mechanism which maximizes the seller's expected utility. In other words, if we use the notation y(A) to denote the probability that the item is unsold when using a given auction mechanism A, then for every truthful mechanism A we have:
Our definition of ν ensures that either x = y = 1 2 or ν = 0, and in the latter case y ≥ 1 2 .
Proof. The first half of the lemma follows by invoking Fact 9 with A = M and noting that y(A) ≥ 0 for every mechanism A.
Proof. For every i, we have pi = φ
as when we post price p the item is sold with the same probability as in Mν , i.e., x.
In the upcoming proofs, it will be useful to define
piqi.
Proof. The revenue R p is bounded below by the summation, over all i, of pi times the probability that i is the unique index satisfying vi ≥ pi, i.e.
Recall that
Combining this with (2) we find that
Proceeding as in Section 3.1, we now partition the sample space into three events Ω0, Ω1, and Ω>1 according to whether the number of indices i satisfying vi ≥ pi is 0, 1, or greater than 1. The expected revenue of Mν, which is the integral of a random variable over the entire sample space, can be expressed as the sum of the integrals over the three pieces Ω0, Ω1, and Ω>1. We denote these three terms by ρ0, ρ1, and ρ>1, respectively.
From the definition of Mν it is obvious that
The following two lemmas bound the remaining two terms ρ1, ρ>1.
Proof. Let the random variable R denote the revenue obtained from using the pricing p, and let Q denote the revenue obtained from using the auction Mν . If i is the unique index satisfying vi ≥ pi, then Q = R = pi. Hence
Lemma 14. ρ>1 ≤ g. 
using Fact 6. Removing the conditioning on v−i, we get that the contribution of bidder i to ρ>1 is Ri < piqi. Summing over all the bidders and recalling that g = P i piqi, we get the result.
Theorem 15. For the pricing p defined above,
Proof. Let χ = 1 if ν > 0 and χ = 0 otherwise. Notice that ν = νχ. We have
[by (3) and (4)]
If ν = 0 then χ = 0 and y ≥ 1 2 , hence b
THE NON-REGULAR CASE
In our analysis in Section 3.2, we used the MHR condition to imply that the functions φi(vi) are non-decreasing. When the MHR condition does not hold, Myerson applies a fix to the problem by smoothing out or "ironing" the virtual valuation function to make it a non-decreasing function of vi. We now show that by picking a pricing based on ironed virtual valuations instead of the actual virtual valuations, we achieve the same guarantee as in the regular case-the revenue of our pricing is within a factor of 4 of the revenue of Myerson's mechanism.
We briefly describe this ironing procedure below. The reader is refered to Myerson's paper [12] and a survey of Bulow and Roberts [6] for more details.
The ironing procedure
The ironed virtual valuation function is defined as follows. Consider a single bidder with value v distributed according to function F . We assume that the density function f (v) is non-zero for all v ∈ [ , h]. For α ∈ [0, 1], let R(α) denote the revenue generated from offering the item to this bidder at price F −1 (α):
LetR(α) be the least-valued concave function on [0, 1] with R(α) ≥ R(α) for all α in that range (see Figure 1 ). Sincē R is concave, it is differentiable everywhere except at finitely many points. Letr(α) denote the derivative ofR wherever defined. The ironed virtual valuation function is defined as below where everr is defined, and is extended to the full 4 Note that F −1 (α) is well-defined because F is a strictly increasing function. range of v by right continuity.
φ(v) = −r(F (v))
Note that sinceR(α) is concave and F (v) is non-decreasing, φ(v) is a non-decreasing function. Furthermore, observing thatR(1) = R(1) = 0, we get the following:
For any ν, the inverse ironed virtual valuationφ −1 (ν) is defined to be the infimum over values v withφ(v) = ν.
Approximate pricing
Myerson's optimal mechanism in the non-regular case proceeds as follows. It first computes the ironed virtual valuations of the values of all bidders. It then allocates the item to the bidder with the highest ironed virtual valuation at a price equal to the inverse of the second highest one.
Our pricing is similarly defined. Let ν be the minimum non-negative number satisfying
We offer the price pi for item i. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 16. In the non-regular case, for the pricing
The proof of this theorem is identical to that of Theorem 15, except that we need analogues of Fact 6 and Fact 9 for ironed virtual valuations. Fact 9 is proven in Myerson's original paper on optimal auction design [12] . We prove the analogue of Fact 6 in Lemma 18 below. We omit a full proof of Theorem 16 for the sake of brevity, since it is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 15.
We need the following property:
Lemma 17. For any ν and v =φ −1 (ν),
Proof. Note that by definition,R is the boundary of the convex hull of the hypograph of R (see Figure 1) . Theorem 18.3.1 in Rockafellar [13] implies that every extreme point of this convex hull lies on the boundary of the hypograph of R. That is, at all extreme points (α,R(α)), we have R(α) = R(α). Furthermore, all points with non-zero curvature, as well as end-points of maximal linear segments in the graph of R, are extreme points of the convex hull (i.e. they cannot be expressed as convex combinations of two other distinct points in the set). Now consider some v =φ −1 (ν). If v is the unique value withφ(v) = ν, thenR has non-zero curvature at F (v) by definition, and soR(F (v)) = R(F (v)). Otherwise, v is the infimum over all values x withφ(x) = ν, in which case F (v) is the left end-point of a maximal linear subsegment inR. Again we haveR(F (v)) = R(F (v)).
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 17 by observing that for v ≥φ −1 (0),φ(v) is non-negative,r(F (v)) is non-positive, and soR(F (v)) is a non-increasing function of v.
We note that Theorem 16 only gives a characterization of an approximately optimal pricing in the non-regular case, and not a poly-time approximation algorithm. We leave open the problem of designing a polynomial time algorithm for this case (in particular, a polynomial time algorithm for computing ironed virtual valuations), noting that for the case when each of the distributions Fi is discrete and explicitly specified, a simple algorithm for computing ironed virtual valuations has been given by Elkind [8] , and this implies a polynomialtime approximation algorithm for the non-regular case with discrete explicit distributions.
A POLYNOMIAL-TIME APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM
We now describe how to implement our algorithm for the regular case in the two computational models described in Section 2.
Implementation in the discrete explicit model is straightforward. Although we have focused on continuous distributions in Sections 3 and 4, we remark that virtual valuations and their inverses for discrete distributions can be defined and computed in much the same way as for continuous distributions. Our algorithm computes virtual valuations of all possible values for each item. During this process it keeps track of Fi(φi −1 (ν)). It then picks the least non-negative ν,
The price of each item i is then defined to be the minimum value vi at which φi(vi) ≥ ν. Each step of the algorithm takes at most linear time in n and the sizes of the supports. The resulting algorithm is a Monte Carlo randomized algorithm, i.e. it outputs a random pricing whose revenue, in expectation, approximates the revenue of the optimal pricing. It is natural to ask whether there is also a Las Vegas algorithm, i.e. one whose output is a good approximation to the revenue of the optimal pricing with probability 1. This question is especially natural given the problem's economic motivation: a firm is likely to feel much safer using an algorithm which always selects approximately optimal prices rather than one which has a small probability of setting disastrously suboptimal prices. However, in this paper we will not consider the question of whether there is a Las Vegas randomized algorithm to compute the optimal pricing.
In order to obtain an implementation in the continuous model with oracles, we use the following lemma from [3] . We present a brief proof for completeness.
Lemma 19. Let p be any price vector, and p be another price vector such that pi ∈ [β, α] pi for all i with β < α < 1.
Proof. Consider any valuation vector v, and let i be the index that maximizes vi − pi. In other words, when prices are given by p and a consumer has values v, the consumer buys item i. On the other hand, let j be the index that maximizes vj − pj . That is, when the prices are given by p , the same consumer buys item j instead of i. The lemma follows from the claim that
To prove this claim, we first observe that vi − pi ≥ vj − pj and vj − pj ≥ vi − pi . Rearranging terms and adding the two we get pi − pi ≤ pj − pj . Finally, using pi ≤ αpi and pj ≥ βpj , we get
The claim now follows by again using the fact that pj ≥ βpj .
Armed with this lemma, our algorithm essentially transforms the continuous case to a discrete version. Let M = (maxi hi)/(mini i). Our algorithm will run in time polynomial in n and M . For each item i, we consider the set Li of values that are powers of γ = 1/(1 − ) for some > 0 in the
Our algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. For each i and each v ∈ Li, compute φi(v) using the oracles for Fi and fi and store these in a sorted list L .
2. For each ν ∈ L , let xi(ν) be (1 − ) times the largest value in Li whose virtual value is at most ν. Note that 5. Let p denote the pricing {xi(ν)} for the virtual value ν that maximizesR(ν). Output p.
We first note that one of the pricings {xi(ν)} for ν ∈ L is a near optimal pricing.
Lemma 20. Let ν * be the minimum non-negative virtual valuation satisfying
Proof. For every i let yi be the largest power of γ = 1/(1 − ) smaller than pi * , and let νi = φi(yi). Let ν = maxi νi. Note that we do not remove ν from the list L in step 2 above. Consider xi(ν). Note that xi(ν) = (1 − )yi by definition, which is less than (1 − )pi * . On the other hand, yi
Applying Lemma 19 with α = (1 − ) and β = (1 − ) 2 we get the result.
The next lemma shows that with a high probability, the estimatesR(ν) are good approximations to the true revenues mini i because we make a sale with probability at least 1 4 . Letting N denote the size of the sample |S(ν)|, and applying the Chernoff bound, we get Proof. Using Lemma 21 and taking a union bound over all ν ∈ L , we get that with probability 1 − all the estimatesR(ν) are within a 1 ± factor of the true revenues R {x i (ν)} . Therefore, the true revenue of the pricing picked by our algorithm is within a (1 − ) 2 factor of the maximum over ν ∈ L of the true revenues R {x i (ν)} . Combining this with Lemma 20, Theorem 15 and the probability of failure, we get that the expected revenue obtained by our algorithm is a 8/(1 − ) 5 approximation to the optimal revenue. An appropriate choice of implies the result.
CONCLUSIONS
Several interesting questions related to BUPP still remain open:
• Is the Bayesian unit-demand pricing problem with independently distributed values NP-hard to solve optimally? There is some evidence that this problem is indeed hard. For example, one can construct two-item instances with extremely simple distributions (e.g., a uniform distribution over some range), where the optimal price is irrational.
• Is our characterization tight? Can one construct an example where the revenue of Myerson's auction is indeed 4 times the revenue of the optimal pricing?
It is worth noting that there is a simple example in which the revenue of the pricing defined by our virtual valuation technique falls short of the optimal pricing by a factor of nearly 2, even in the i.i.d. case. Suppose that for each i, the distribution of vi is given by
Pr[vi = 1] = 1 − 1 n 2 . The optimal pricing sets p1 = 1 and pi = n for all i > 1. This achieves a revenue of 2 − o(1). However, for every ν the pricing which sets pi = φ −1 (ν) achieves a revenue of at most 1. (In this example the revenue of Myerson's auction is nearly equal to 2, so the example does not prove any separation between the revenue of Myerson's auction and that of the optimal pricing.)
• Extending this work to accommodate combinatorial consumers seems tricky. An optimal pricing in that case may offer bundles at prices higher or lower than the sum of the prices of individual items in the bundle.
• Finally, a more general selling mechanism in the unitdemand case may offer lotteries to consumers. A lottery is a distribution over single items, sold at a price (typically) lower than the prices for the individual items. The revenue of the optimal collection of lotteries is not always bounded above by the revenue of Myerson's auction. In fact when values are correlated, the revenue of the optimal single-item pricing can be an exponential factor smaller than the revenue of the optimal collection of lotteries.
[13] R. Tyrrell Rockafellar. Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press, 1970. 
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